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Tämän opinnäytetyön tarkoituksena on tutkia ja kehittää hätäpysäytysjärjestelmä
Wärtsilän Marine Solutions - moottorilaboratorioon. Moottorilaboratorio sijaitsee
Vaasassa, Vaskiluodossa. Nykyinen hätäpysäytysjärjestelmä on rakennettu
muokkaamalla alkuperäistä järjestelmää. Rakennus on alunperin toiminut
voimalaitoksena, josta se on muutettu moottorilaboratorioksi vuonna 2004.
Moottorilaboratoriota on laajennettu useampaan otteeseen vuosien saatossa.
Monien muutosten vuoksi nykyisen järjestelmän muokkaaminen tarpeita
vastaavaksi on hidasta ja monimutkaista. Järjestelmän toiminta pohjautuu
useampaan erilaiseen ratkaisuun, suurilta osin vanhaan relelogiikkaan, joka ei täytä
nykyisiä tarpeita. Tässä työssä suunniteltu järjestelmä on sopiva
moottorilaboratorioon. Suunnittelu ja yksityiskohtaiset piirustukset kahdesta
hätäpysäytysjärjestelmän paneelista on tehty AutoCAD 2016 ohjelmalla, sisältäen
tarpeelliset sähkö- ja mekaaniset piirustukset.
Käyttämällä safety PLC:tä ja hardwire – kommunikaatiota, saadaan rakennettua
hätäpysäytysjärjestelmä, joka on ominaisuuksiltaan sopiva jakuvasti muuttuvaan
ympäristöön. Järjestelmä on suunniteltu mahdollisimman itsenäiseksi, mikä
mahdollistaa järjestelmän toimivuuden ympäristöstä riippumatta. Tämä vähentää
muutoksista johtuvien pysähdyksien määrää, parantaen testilaboratorion toimintaa
vähentämällä turhia pysäytyksiä. Suunniteltu systeemi täyttää sille asetetut
toimintavaatimukset. Suunniteltu systeemi otetaan käyttöön moottorilaboratoriossa
alue kerrallaan, mahdollisuuksien mukaan. Tavoitteena on laajentaa suunniteltu
systeemi kattamaan koko moottorilaboratorio.
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The purpose of this thesis is to study different possibilities of emergency stop
systems to Wärtsilä Marine Solutions engine laboratory. The engine laboratory is
located in Vaasa, Vaskiluoto. The current system has been expanded several times
on top of original system. The facilities was originally a power plant and had been
rebuilt as an engine laboratory in 2004, the engine laboratory has been rebuilt and
enlarged on multiple times during the years.
Due to multiple expansions, flexibility in updating the emergency stop system
needs improvement. The current system is based on multiple different technical
solutions,  partially  on  old  relay  logic,  which  does  not  meet  the  requirements  on
flexibility. The new system is designed to fit in the test facility environment. The
designed system is planned and detailed drawings for the two panels were made
with the AutoCAD 2016, including detailed electrical drawings with the mechanical
drawings.
With the safety PLC system and hardwire communication, the emergency stop
system is made suitable for constantly changing environment. The system is
designed to be as independent as possible to ensure the functionality of the system,
as well minimizing the downtime caused by the modifications and chances around
the  system.  Designing  of  the  system  fulfils  the  requirements  given  to  it  and  the
designed system is taken in use at the test laboratory, one area at a time wherever
possible.
Keywords system, logic controller, safety PLC and test laboratory
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81 INTRODUCTION
1.1 History of Wärtsilä Oyj
Wärtsilä was established in 1834 at Saario rapids as a sawmill. The sawmill was
bought by N.L. Arppe, who build an iron mill on the place of the sawmill. In the
following years Wärtsilä grew rapidly expanding various manufacturing plants and
companies. The company´s headquarters moved to Helsinki in 1935 and Wärtsilä
invested heavily in ship manufacturing business. In 1942 the first diesel engine was
manufactured in Turku factory as a licence engine. Today Wärtsilä is the global
leader in advanced marine technology and energy markets. /1/
1.2 Organisation
Wärtsilä Oy consists of three divided areas, Energy Solutions, Marine Solutions
and Service. /2/ Energy Solution focuses on delivering flexible, efficient multi fuel
power plants for customers and fuel handling solutions. /3/ Marine Solutions is
focused on marine industry, mainly on marine engines, ship designing, propulsion
systems and auxiliary systems at marine industry. /4/ Service is focused on
supporting Energy Solutions and Marine Solutions. Service offers spare parts,
maintenance and operation solutions for Energy Solutions and Marine Solutions
customers. /5/
1.3 Vaskiluoto Engine Laboratory
The Vaskiluoto Engine Laboratory is located in Vaskiluoto, Vaasa. Wärtsilä Pilot
Power Plant, WPPP Diesel Combined Cycle Plant was taken in use an 1997. The
Power plant consisted of two engines and a steam turbine.
The two Wärtsilä engines were Wärtsilä 12V64 (23,280 kWm) and Wärtsilä
20V46F (23000 kWm).  The  engines  used  a  heavy  fuel  oil  (HFO)  as  a  fuel.  The
exhaust heat of the engine was recovered in boilers and used to power the steam
9turbine. The steam turbine was manufactured by ABB Turbinen Nürnberg GmbH.
The electrical efficiency of the turbine was 5 MW.
The power plant was producing electricity for the Vaasa area until 2004 Wärtsilä
converted the power plant into a testing facility for validating engines and engine
parts. The testing facility environment required changes and the steam turbine with
steam boilers have been removed. The facility has been expanded many times as
the original power plant building consisted of two engine cells, an auxiliary area,
two boilers and the steam turbine. Today the building consist of three engine test
cells, two single cylinder test cells and multiple test rig areas with auxiliary areas.
1.4 Objectives and Requirements
The objectives of this work are to create a standard expandable emergency stop
system  solution  which  is  suitable  for  the  test  cell  environment  at  engine  test
laboratory.  The  work  consists  of  a  study  of  a  current  system,  a  comparison  of
different technical solutions and selecting the most suitable one. The suitable
solution should have the following characteristic:
- The emergency stop system should be modular for adding or removing
emergency system areas without having an effect on the rest of the facility.
- Adding or removing functions to the emergency stop system without
disturbing the operation of the rest of the facility.
- Universally expandable for new test cells and areas in the testing facility.
The chosen solution is planned in details, then one module should be constructed,
implemented and tested.
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2 ORIGINAL SYSTEM
2.1 The Building
The engine laboratory has been expanded for a few times and testing facilities has
been rebuild multiple times. The testing facilities are under constant changes for
meeting requirements for testing and validation purposes. The engine laboratory
consists of three engine test cells, two single cylinder test cells and multiple test rig
areas with auxiliary areas. The emergency stop system has been expanded along
with the old system as the facilities has been rebuild and expanded. The expansions
have been built with own emergency stop systems connected to the original system.
At the expansions some new solutions have been tested for the emergency stop
system, varying from simple relay based solutions to the safety PLC solution.
The most complex system is the original emergency stop cabin, named as BAP903,
located in the auxiliary area. It was built in 1997 to be used as an engine power
plant emergency stop system and modified to suit test facility environment. The
cabin works as an emergency stop cabin for engine test cells 1 & 2 as the auxiliary
area, controlling the equipment in the auxiliary area according to the test cells
emergency stop requirements. The BAP903 acts as a junction point for the fire
alarm signal. If a fire alarm occurs, the BAP903 creates a fire alarm signal for all
emergency stop areas, generating emergency stop to the testing facility.
2.2 Impracticality of BAP903
The electrical cabin BAP903 consists of 48 pieces of 110 VDC relays, creating
relay logic for emergency stop function. The cabin is powered with one 110 VDC
UPS feeder (UPS = Uninterruptible Power Supply) through circuit breaker. A
circuit breaker protects the cabin electrical equipment in case of short circuit or
other fault in the electrical cabin. This non-redundant power supply system creates
a situation; when a circuit breaker trips or feeder shuts down, it creates a situation
equal to fire alarm, generating an emergency stop to testing facility.
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Some of the cabin functions have been bypassed with jumping cables for modifying
the functionality of the relay logic more suitable for current setup, as part of the
systems has been removed or modified heavily. As seen in Figure 1, the cabin
cabling has been modified many times creating a messy wiring. One of the greatest
problems with the cabin is that the documentation for modifications is unclear, the
cabin is not in the same state as shown in the electrical drawings. The modifications
have not been marked with full details or marked at all. The cabin has limited space
for expansions or modifications.
Figure 1. Common panel BAP903 messy and unclear wiring created by many
modifications and add-ons.
As the cabin has been built using a relay logic the single fault at wiring or faulty
contact in the logic tree can create a danger situation as functionality of the relay
logic is crippled. A crippled system may have part of functions intact and the system
may seem to work as it should be. A danger situation is created when an emergency
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stop is demanded but the partially crippled system cannot perform a full emergency
stop as required, for example some machines do not get a stop signal and stay on.
2.3 Current System
As in test cells, the emergency stop system varies and every test cell has its own
solution. Without common guidelines or instructions the emergency stops in the
test  cells  have  been  built  with  a  solution  found to  be  most  suitable  to  use  at  the
moment. Solutions vary from simple relay logics to safety PLC solutions. Different
areas have different solutions, without common guidelines every design is different.
The simplest solution is the relay based solution, a simple relay logic with the relay
contact connected on the machine control circuit for emergency stop purposes. The
safety relay is slightly advanced version compared to the relay solution, slightly
reducing the relay logic as the safety relay itself has an integrated locking for
blocking an unintended start after an emergency stop button has been restored. The
safety PLC solution is programmable logic controller based solution, consisting of
safety-classified, freely programmable PLC-hardware.
The main difficulties with the current system have occurred with the common panel
BAP903. BAP903 has been originally used as an emergency stop cabin for the
power plant and modified for the use of testing laboratory. The main modification
for BAP903 is to share the fire alarm signal for all parts of the building to stop the
machines for safety reasons and shut down the building equipment to prevent the
fire spreading as a fire alarm occurs.
2.4 System Usability and Flexibility
At the moment (2017) BAP903 is serving as an emergency stop cabin for test cells
1 & 2 and the auxiliary area as sharing the fire alarm signal. As the cabin serves
many areas, it creates an inflexible junction for adding or removing areas. Many
expansions and modifications have created messy wiring and cabling inside
BAP903, increasingly slowing down the modifications. In case of modification of
the relay logic the whole building is affected for one point modification, slowing
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down the testing inside the building unnecessarily. For adding new equipment for
the emergency stop system the cabin has a few potential free contacts left. Other
areas consist of emergency stop system comprising a relay or safety relay based
solution integrated into the control cabin. The newest test cell, number 7 has safety
PLC – based solution. Test cell 7 uses Phoenix Contact freely configurable safety
module PSR-TRISAFE-M, with one safety relay expansion to archive the needed
functionality for the single cylinder engine.
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3 STANDARD SYSTEM PLANNING
3.1 Emergency Stop Effected Areas
The EU Machinery Directive 2006/42/EC determines the emergency stop
installation requirements for machines as following: “Machinery  must  be  fitted
with  one  or  more  emergency  stop  devices  to  enable  actual  or  impending
danger  to be  averted.”. /6/
And adding following expectations:
- “machinery  in  which  an  emergency  stop  device  would  not  lessen  the
risk,  either  because  it  would  not reduce  the  stopping  time  or  because
it  would  not  enable  the  special  measures  required  to  deal  with  the
risk  to be  taken,
- portable hand-held and/or hand-guided machinery.” /6/
The EU Machine Directive 2006/42/EC requires an emergency stop device to be
fitted on machine or equipment to stop the dangerous situation if the emergency
stop reduces the stopping time of the machine. In the test laboratory the emergency
stop reduces stop time as the control system has a possibility for the fault and the
control system may not have total control of all the machines in the area. For this
reason the emergency stop system is required on the testing facility. The test
laboratory consists of many machines creating a complex systems that can cause an
actual or impending danger for the operator. A danger situation can be ended or
averted quickly with an emergency stop. When the operator notices a danger or a
potentially dangerous situation in the area, the closest emergency stop pushbutton
located in the area has to be effective to stop the machines and stop the danger or
the potential danger situation. If an emergency situation occurs, the operator should
to be able to stop the potential danger situation or danger at the closest emergency
stop pushbutton in the area and in the control room.
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3.2 Emergency Stop Areas
The emergency stop system controls a certain limited area. Mostly the building
itself creates the limits on what is practical and safe to connect to the emergency
stop system in the area. As the emergency stop has been modified from the original
emergency stop system, it has created overlapping in the area at test cell 1 and 2 in
the auxiliary area seen in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Existing emergency stop areas in the building. Orange lines shows the 1st.
floor emergency stop areas and blue dotted line the 2nd. floor emergency stop areas.
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By separating the over-lapping areas and creating a fully independent emergency
stop area, it is possible to ensure the correct functionality for the emergency stop at
all the areas without a effecting other areas. For ensuring the functionality the
auxiliary area emergency stop system has a hard wire communication for test cells
1 and 2. The control of the auxiliary area equipment emergency stop is in auxiliary
area emergency stop system. If an emergency stop occurs on test cells 1 or 2, the
auxiliary area emergency stop system controls the auxiliary area equipment
according to needs of the test cells 1 and 2. In the other areas the emergency stop
system has only effect on the machines in the area of the emergency stop
pushbutton. This area is limited physically to a room or a certain area. The main
point with the emergency stop areas is that if the operator sees a danger or potential
danger situation, the operator can stop or avert the danger on closest emergency
stop pushbutton in the area.
The only change in the existing areas of the emergency stop systems are in the
auxiliary area, separating the auxiliary are to its own emergency stop system for
test cells 1 and 2. The building consists of three engine test cells, five test rig areas,
two single cylinder test engines and two multi-purpose areas as seen in Figure 3.
All the areas have to have their own emergency stop system only serving an exact
area. This ensures the independency of emergency stop areas and meets the
requirement as independent emergency stop areas can be modified and
added/removed without disturbing of the functionality of other areas, eliminating
downtime of the test cells and test rigs in case of modification of the system.
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Figure 3. Planned building emergency stop areas. Orange lines shows the 1st. floor
emergency stop areas and blue dotted line the 2nd. floor emergency stop areas.
Building consist 12 areas and 12 emergency stop areas.
3.3 Different Technical Solutions
The most common technical solutions can be divided into three different
technologies already used at the building: 1. Relay 2. Safety relay 3. Safety PLC.
Each of these three different technical solutions has its advantages. A short review
shows differences between the solutions.
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3.3.1 Relay solution
The emergency stop solution with relays requires a hardwired relay logic. Adding
and removing equipment for the emergency stop system is simply to add a new
relay on the emergency stop cabin in the control circle with others to archive the
required potential free contact for the equipment. Adding more functions or
modifying the functionality requires carefully planned wire and relay
modifications. The relay based solution has a few advantages:
- Low cost solution
- Simple design
- Easy repairs and maintains by simplicity
While relay based solutions have a few notable advantages, there are also
disadvantages:
- Inflexibility for the changes
- Functionality modifications requires hardware modifications
- Relay logic failure can paralyze the system in emergency situation
3.3.2 Safety Relay Solution
The emergency stop solution with safety relays integrates interlocking with the
emergency stop system. The safety relay reduces the number of relays as the safety
relays add interlocking. Safety relays require relays as an expansion to share the
alarm on with the equipment and to a create sub-logic for necessary logic functions
and functionality as the system serves a lot of equipment in the electrical cabin. The
advantages of the safety relay solutions includes:
- Low cost solution
- Interlocking function integrated in safety relay
- Safe functionality through the safety relay
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As the safety relay is a more advanced solution compared to the relay solution, it
comes with a few disadvantages:
- Inflexibility for changes
- Logical functionality for the equipment control with relay extensions
- Relay logic failure can paralyze the system in an emergency situation
- Different alarms their own safety relay
3.3.3 Safety PLC solution
The emergency stop solution with a safety PLC solution eliminates all needs for a
hardwired logic, as the safety PLC programming functionality allows all the logic
functions inside the safety PLC. Every equipment is connected to the safety PLC
and the safety PLC logic controls the equipment according to the logic
programming. For changing the safety functions no hard wire modifications are
needed as the safety functions can be changed through the safety PLC
programming. Every times the safety PLC programs are modified, the program
functionality needs to be tested with suitable methods to ensure the safety of the
system. The advantages of the safety PLC solution includes:
- Flexibility for modifications
- Functionality modifications do not require the wire modifications
- Programming allows many individual safety functions
- Hard-wired communication
The safety PLC solution has only a few disadvantages compared with other
solutions, including the high cost of parts and relatively high space requirements
for the cabin installation.
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3.4 Suitable Solution
The customer recommended creating the emergency stop system using the safety
PLC solution as the building is in constant changing for the test purposes. With the
flexibility of the safety PLC the emergency stop system is a flexible. Independent
safety areas give a significant advantage for the current system, adding or removing
area does not have an effect on the functionality of the other areas, reducing
valuable test time loss for modifications of the safety system.
When comparing the technical solutions the safety PLC system has many
advantages over the relay and safety relay solution. The main advantages of the
safety PLC solution over the other solutions include programming, wiring
simplicity, expandability and hardwired cross - area communication possibilities.
The cross area communication enables the possibility to control safely the devices
safely, which affects the safety of the area but are located on the other areas.
3.5 Hierarchy of Planned System
The hierarchy of the emergency stop system is divided into two levels. The first
level,  the  common panel  controls  all  the  test  emergency  stop  areas  and  building
equipment and the second level at the independent emergency stop areas with each
one with the own emergency stop equipment. Common panel alarms override the
functionalities of the emergency stop areas. For example, when a fire alarm occurs,
the common panel stops the common equipment in the building and every test cells
emergency  stop  system  gets  a  signal  for  fire  alarm.  The  own  systems  in  the
emergency stop area performs an emergency stop according to the programming,
stopping all the equipment in the area for the fire alarm. The common panel has no
direct effect on the emergency stop areas, only through the area emergency stop
system.
If the operator pushes the emergency stop pushbutton, the emergency stop system
in the area is activated and performs an emergency stop in the area, stopping a
potential danger or danger situation. The area emergency stop system is only
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effective inside the emergency stop area, unless necessary for safety of the area.
The basic principle of the hierarchy can be seen in Figure 4.
Figure 4. Principle of hierarchy in the emergency stop system.
3.6 Technical Solution of Emergency Stop
The emergency stop has an effect on the equipment in the emergency stop area
creating a stop-signal for the machines located in the area. Every machine has its
own control system, mainly operated on/off by the operator or the test cell PLC.
When the operator requests an emergency stop, the operator pushes the closest
emergency stop pushbutton opening the emergency stop circuit. The opening of
emergency  stop  circuit  is  noted  by  the  safety  PLC  and  the  safety  PLC  controls
electrical components according to the program.
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In the emergency stop cabin every machine has one potential free N/O contact in
use for the emergency stop control. With a potential free contact the machine
connected to the emergency stop system has no voltage limitations and requires less
modifications for connecting equipment into the emergency stop system. The N/O
contact is connected to the equipment control circuit as the contact is closed,
equipment can run. If the contact opens, the machine stops by de-energising the
power circuit, done directly by N/O contact cutting the power for the machine main
contactor or machine control circuit. The machines might need minor modifications
to suit on system. A usual modification of the machine to fit the system is to connect
an emergency stop relay K700 on control circuit. Relay K700 controls the main
contactor of the machine, blocking the activation of main contactor in case of an
active emergency stop. A fire alarm comes to the common panel as a hard-wired
signal. The technical principle is shown in Figure 5.
Usually emergency stops have been connected to one “ring”. For adding flexibility
all emergency stops have individual input on the safety PLC. Emergency stop
pushbuttons is connected to the safety PLC with programming. Adding an
emergency stop pushbutton as individuals reduces the time used for modifications,
as every emergency stop has individual cabling and adding a new pushbutton does
not require modifications in the existing installations.
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Figure 5. Technical principle of the emergency stop area.
If cross-area communication is needed between different emergency stop areas, for
example test cell 1 and auxiliary area, the common cabin has six pre-wired
connection to all emergency stop cabins. One pair is used for fire alarm information,
leaving two pairs for each test cell free to use. If the safety of the system requires
the control of the equipment in another area, these existing connections can be used
to hard-wire communication the between areas. Common panels act as a junction
box for hardwire communication as minor wiring modification allows hard-wired
communication between the test cells, saving installation time as no cable
installations needed.
For increasing the independency of each emergency stop system, the emergency
stop system is installed in its own electrical cabin inside the emergency stop area.
3.7 Technical Solution of Common Panel
The common panel replaces original BAP903 in the building. The main function of
the common panel is to share fire alarms in the emergency stop areas and control
the building equipment. BAP903 emergency stop functions for the auxiliary area,
test  cell  1 and 2 will  have their  own emergency stop cabins as divided into their
own emergency stop areas. The common panel shares the fire alarm signal a hard-
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wired signal for the emergency stop areas, maximizing the independency of the
emergency stop system areas. Hardwired communication is technically done with
the relay contact of the safety PLC extension cards, each extension card has four
independent relay contacts. Hard-wired communication allows modifications and
adding a new emergency stop area without affecting other emergency stop areas.
Hard-wired communication keeps the system reliable and simple, allowing flexible
modifications unlike any other technical solutions. The basic principle can be seen
in Figure 6.
Figure 6. Technical principle of the common panel.
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3.8 Naming of the System
The naming of the emergency stop cabins has a certain kind of logic. The name of
the common panel name CJU901 consists of the following logic:
- CJU = According to Wärtsilä Power Plants grouping & coding of process
& signals the code of emergency stop system
- 901 = 9 as the first number indicates the common system and 01 indicates
the first in the series
An emergency stop cabin CJU021 at the test cell areas:
- CJU = According to Wärtsilä Power Plants grouping & coding of process
& signals the code of emergency stop system
- 021 = 02 as the first two number indicate the second test cell. 1 as the third
number indicates the first system in the area
An emergency stop cabin CJU511 at the test rig areas:
- CJU = According to Wärtsilä Power Plants grouping & coding of process
& signals the code of emergency stop system
- 511 = 5 as the first  number indicates the system to be part  of the test  rig
system. The second number 1 indicates the first area and last 1 indicates the
first system in the area.
All the building emergency stop areas will follow this naming logic, keeping
naming compatible  with  Wärtsilä  Power  Plants  grouping  & coding  of  process  &
signals.
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4 DESIGN OF SAFETY PLC SOLUTION
4.1 Functionality Requirements
The requirements of the emergency stop system created a common guideline for
functionality and the functionality itself created hardware requirements. The
designing of the system has been planned to meet the requirements and to be user
friendly at the same time without compromising the functionality and safety.
- The system requires easy modification, an independent emergency system
should to be modular for adding or removing emergency system areas
without affecting the rest of the facility.
- Adding or removing functions to the emergency stop system without
disturbing the operation of the rest of the facility.
The design of the emergency stop system was mostly done with AutoCAD 2016 as
the drawings were done to construct and implement the design of the system. In the
meetings the customer instructed that they do not prefer using semiconductor
outputs at all if other options are available. Designs for two electrical cabins,
common panel CJU901 and test rig area emergency stop cabin CJU541, consist
mainly of the same parts. The full electrical drawings for both cabins can be seen
in Appendices 2 and 4
4.2 Hardware
The hardware design was mainly driven by system requirements and earlier
experience with products. The Vaskiluoto engine laboratory has experience of using
Phoenix Contact products. Some level of standardising has been done with the most
common parts in use, for example a certain model of relay has been chosen to be
commonly in use as the replacement part. Standardising the common parts in the
use of one type reduces the need of different spare parts, saving the storage room
for other uses and eases the maintaining of the electrical systems as a variety of the
parts is reduced. All the electrical components inside the electrical cabin will be
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mounted on 35mm DIN-rail. The complete list of used parts is available in
Appendices 5 with detailed information and trade numbers.
4.2.1 Power Source
The power supply for the emergency stop system was chosen to be two 110 VDC
UPS feeders located at the building, ensuring the functionality of the emergency
stop system even in case of a partial power loss, maximizing the system uptime and
reducing the unnecessary stops of the test equipment. With two power supplies the
power  feed  for  the  emergency  stop  system  is  redundant,  the  loss  of  one  power
supply does not result in the loss of power. As the safety PLC requires the 24V DC
voltage level, the 110V DC power feeds connect to the power supply transforming
110V DC to 24 V DC. A redundant system requires the diode or redundancy module
to block the possibility for back feed. Without the diode or redundancy module if
either of the power sources fails, the intact power supply may start to feed power to
the failed power supply creating a back feed situation.
The  power  source  model  was  chosen  to  be  a  common  model  in  use  around  the
building, regulating the need of different power sources as spare parts. The suitable
power source was chosen to be Phoenix Contact QUINT-PS/1AC/24DC/10.
(Figure 7)
The technical data for Phoenix Contact QUINT-PS/1AC/24DC/10 power source
- Nominal input voltage: 100 V AC … 240 V AC / 110 V DC … 250 V DC
- AC frequency range: 45 Hz … 65 Hz
- Nominal power consumption: 257 W
- Nominal output voltage: 24 V DC ± 1 %
- Nominal output current (IN): 10 A
- Connection method: Pluggable screw connection
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The technical data for Phoenix Contact QUINT-ORING/24DC/2X10/1X20
redundancy module
- Nominal input voltage: 24 V DC
- Nominal input current: 2x 10 A, 1x 20 A
- Nominal output voltage: 0.1 V < DC input
- Nominal output current (IN): 20 A (increased power) 10 A (redundancy)
- Power loss nominal load max.: 2 W ( IOUT = 20 A )
Figure 7. Phoenix Contact QUINT-PS/1AC/24DC/10 power source (left and in the
middle) QUINT-ORING/24DC/2X10/1X20 redundancy module. (on the right) /7/
The power supplies are connected parallel to the redundancy module. The
redundancy module monitors both inputs and balances the use of two power
supplies evenly maximizing the lifetime of the power supplies. If one power supply
fails, the redundancy module has normally closed contact to inform for the loss of
redundancy. The second contact in the redundancy module informs if the voltage
of one of the power supplies is lower than required. The redundancy module model
has been chosen to be compatible with the power modules. The redundancy module
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has an advantage over diode module with power loss. According to the
manufacturer the power loss of equal performing diode redundancy module
(Phoenix Contact TRIO-DIODE/12-24DC/2X10/1X20) has a power loss approx.
10 W at nominal 10 A load /8/. The redundancy module power loss on maximum
nominal load 20 A is 2 W (Phoenix Contact QUINT-ORING/24DC/2X10/1X20)
/9/.
4.2.2 Safety PLC
The safety PLC for the project was chosen to be the same model as in use in the
building in one of the test cells. The safety PLC model is the same as used in the
emergency stop system in the test cell 7. The safety PLC master module is Phoenix
Contact PSR-SCP-24DC/TS/M freely configurable safety module (Figure 8). The
safety PLC is part of the Phoenix Contact PSR-TRISAFE configurable Safety PLC-
series. The PSR-TRISAFE product series consists of different Safety PLC master
and extension modules. The PSR-TRISAFE-M master device is expandable with
10 extension modules. Extension modules connects to the master module with the
PSR-TBUS – connectors underneath the extension module to the master module.
The principle of PSR-TBUS connectors can be seen in Figure 9.
The technical data of Phoenix Contact PSR-SCP-24DC/TS/M
- Nominal input voltage: 24 V DC
- Typical input current UN: 110 mA
- Number of safety inputs: 20
- Number of safe semiconductor outputs: 4
- Limiting continuous current for safe semiconductor: 2 A
- Number of alarm outputs: 4
- Limiting continuous current for alarm outputs: 100 mA
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Figure 8 (left). Phoenix Contact PSR-SCP-24DC/TS/M. Figure 9 (right). Principle
of PSR-TBUS bus connector for connecting extension modules for PSR-TRISAFE
modules. /10 – 11/
The PSR-SCP-24DC/TS/M programming is made with the SAFECONF-
programming tool, free to download program is found on the Phoenix Contact web
page. The tool is easy to use and the programming style is function block diagram.
The SAFECONF program does not need to have any outside connection for
creating  a  program  and  SAFECONF  has  a  simulation  abilities  for  testing  the
program without hardware, allowing to make a changes in the program beforehand,
thus minimizing the downtime of the emergency stop system for the maintenance.
4.2.3 Safety PLC Extension Module
The extension modules have two different options, relay output extension module
PSR-SCP- 24DC/TS/SDOR4/4X1 (Figure 10) and input/output extension module
PSR-SCP- 24DC/TS/SDI8/SDIO4 (Figure 11). Both the extension modules
connect to the PSR-TRISAFE-M master module with a PSR-TBUS connector and
both extension modules have identical outside dimensions. For the design of the
emergency stop system only PSR-SCP-24DC/TS/SDOR4/4X1 was used as an
extension module as the customer preferred not to have semiconductor outputs in
use.
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The technical data of Phoenix Contact PSR-SCP-24DC/TS/SDOR4/4X1
- Nominal input voltage: 24 V DC (via PSR-TBUS)
- Typical input current at UN: 120 mA
- Number of safe relay output contacts: 4
- Maximum switching voltage: 250 V AC / 24 V DC
- Limiting continuous current: 4 A
- Number of alarm outputs: 4
The technical data of Phoenix Contact PSR-SCP-4DC/TS/SDI8/SDIO4
- Nominal input voltage: 24 V DC (via PSR-TBUS)
- Typical input current at UN: 100 mA
- Number of safety inputs: 12
- Typical current consumptions: 4 mA
- Number of safe semiconductor outputs: 4
- Limiting continuous current: 4x 0.5 A
Figure 10 (left). Phoenix Contact PSR-SCP-24DC/TS/SDOR4/4X1. Figure 11
(right). Phoenix Contact PSR-SCP-4DC/TS/SDI8/SDIO4. /12 – 13/
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If the system expansion requires more inputs, the only option is to add one PSR-
SCP-4DC/TS/SDI8/SDIO4 extension card to the safety PLC system. One card adds
12 safety inputs to the system at the time.
4.2.4 Control Relays
As the manufacturer of PSR-SCP-24DC/TS/SDOR4/4X1 allows the maximum
switching voltage to be 250 V AC / 24 V DC in case of potential free contact for
the  machines  and  equipment  control,  the  24  V DC limit  is  not  enough for  every
machine, part of the test machines use higher control voltage. To bypass the voltage
limitation as well as current limits the expansion card controls the universal safety
relay with forcibly guided contacts. Phoenix Contact PSR-SCF-24UC/URM/2X21
relay is in use in many machines and equipment control circuits as well accepted in
multi-purpose relay in engine laboratory for reducing the number of different spare
parts (Figure 12). The relay contact type is 2 PDT as seen in Figure 13.
The technical data of Phoenix Contact PSR-SCF-24UC/URM/2X21
- Nominal input voltage: 24 V AC/DC
- Typical input current at UN: 30 mA
- Contact type: 2 PDT
- Maximum switching voltage: 250 V AC/DC
- Limiting continuous current: 5 A (N/O contact) 3.5 A (N/C contact)
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Figure 12 (left). Phoenix Contact PSR-SCF-24UC/URM/2X21. Figure 13 (right).
The circuit diagram of PSR-SCF-24UC/URM/2X21. /14 – 15/
Phoenix Contact PSR-SCF-24UC/URM/2X21 is a common and reliable relay for
the emergency stop system to use and by using it for multiple purposes in future
reduces the need of different spare parts. An integrated diode bridge allows to use
AC voltage for relay control.
4.2.5 Terminal Blocks
Terminal blocks for the cables take a major part of the electrical cabin as all the
cables coming into and leaving the cabin are installed to the system through the
terminals. For saving space for future expansions a part of the terminal bocks are
double-level terminals. Double level terminals save the space used by terminals by
50% and offer the same usability as single level terminals. Part of the terminals are
regular feed-through terminal blocks for practicality reasons. For 24 V DC voltage
power distribution the terminal blocks used are 2- connection feed-through terminal
blocks as they offer four connection points per terminal block. The connection
method for all terminal blocks used is the push-in connection. The terminal blocks
can be connected vertically with potential bridges and double level terminal block
levels can be connected internally with a potential bridge.
All terminal blocks used in the emergency stop system are manufactured by
Phoenix Contact. Three types of terminal blocks are used in the project. Phoenix
Contact Feed-through terminal block ST 1,5 (Figure 14), Phoenix Contact feed-
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through terminal block ST 1,5-QUATTRO (Figure 15) and Phoenix Contact
double-level terminal block PTTB 1,5/S (Figure 16).
The technical data of Phoenix Contact feed-through terminal block ST 1,5, Phoenix
Contact feed-through terminal block ST 1,5-QUATTRO, Phoenix Contact double-
level terminal block PTTB 1,5/S
- Number of levels: 1
- Number of connections: 2
- Nominal cross section: 1.5 mm2
- Nominal current IN: 17.5 A
- Nominal voltage UN: 500 V
- Connection method: Spring-cage connection
Figure 14 (left). Phoenix Contact ST 1.5 with two ST 1.5-PE. Figure 15 (middle).
Phoenix Contact 1.5-QUATTRO with two 1.5-QUATTRO-PE. Figure 16 (right)
Phoenix Contact PTTB 1.5/S. /16 – 18/
The double level terminals area used for emergency stop pushbutton cable
connections and equipment cable connections. Using the double level terminal
blocks for connecting the emergency stop pushbuttons, the emergency stop
pushbutton can be simulated for the safety PLC by shortcutting the double level
terminal with the potential bridge. To install an emergency stop pushbutton the
wires can be connected to the short cut double level terminal block, while the
system is running normally. After connecting the wires, the removal of the potential
bridge connects the installed emergency stop to the system. This allows the
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installation and removal of emergency stop pushbuttons without programming
modifications, when emergency stop pushbuttons have been pre-programmed on
the safety PLC.
4.2.6 Terminal Block Accessories
Terminal block accessories include terminal block end covers, end clamps, terminal
marker carrier, plug-in bridge and terminal block numbering. The end covers close
the open side of the terminal block. For saving space the Phoenix Contact terminal
blocks have the right side open. As terminal blocks are installed in a row the next
terminal block on the right side closes the previous terminal block open side. The
last terminal block of the row needs to be closed with an end cover to ensure the
electrical safety of the terminal block. Three types of terminal blocks are in use in
the project and all of the three types need a correct end cover. The end covers are
used to separate the certain groups of the terminal blocks in the terminal block rows
as extra guidance for installation. The three models of the end covers used in the
project are Phoenix Contact end cover D-ST 2.5, Phoenix Contact end cover D-ST
2.5-QUATTRO and Phoenix Contact end cover D-PTTB 1.5/S.
The end clamp keeps a row of terminal block tightly together on the DIN-rail  as
possible mechanical vibration can divide and move terminal blocks on the DIN-
rail. A terminal marker carrier is used for marking the identification code for the
row of terminal blocks or other electrical cabin equipment. The terminal marker
carrier is installed on top of the end clamp. The identification code of the terminal
block row is located on right side of the terminal block row or equipment. The end
clamp model used is Phoenix Contact E/UK-NS 35 and the marker model is
Phoenix Contact KLM-A.
With a plug-in bridge the terminal block can be connected in groups without any
wiring, for example the power distribution with ST 1.5-QUATTRO. The terminal
block numbering allows to name and identify a terminal block. Identifying the
terminal block is vital for installing and wiring the electrical equipment to the
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electrical cabin. Phoenix Contact offers terminal block number printing service.
Correctly printed terminal numbers save installation time as terminal block
numbers can be installed as snap-on parts. The suitable terminal number model for
Phoenix Contact feed-through terminal block ST 1.5 and Phoenix Contact feed-
through terminal block PTTB 1.5/S is ZB 4 CUS (CUS = customer order specific).
For Phoenix Contact feed-through terminal block PTTB 1.5/S model is ZBF 3.5
CUS.
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5 CABIN ASSEMBLY
5.1 Planning
The  cabin  assembly  has  to  be  clear  and  easy  to  understand.  By  designing  the
position  of  the  electrical  components  properly  it  is  possible  to  use  the  minimum
amount of wiring and installation time for cabin assembly. For the positioning of
electrical components there is a common practice. These kind of practises include
the use of terminal blocks to connect the outside cables to the cabin assembly, the
position of terminals in the cabin assembly and the common positioning of
electrical components.
At the Vaskiluoto engine laboratory the Rittal enclosures have been preferred to use
because of good experiences of the Rittal products and to keep the enclosures as
homogenous as possible as good practice.
5.1.1 Cabin
The cabins preferred in the emergency stop system is Rittal Compact enclosure AE.
Rittal Compact enclosure AE is a sheet metal compact enclosure electrical cabin,
powder-coated outside with texture painting and a detachable mounting plate. As
for  the  size  the  recommended  cabin  depth  is  the  minimum  of  300mm  to  ensure
enough space for electrical components. For leaving room for future expansions at
the Vaskiluoto engine laboratory the common practise for estimating expansion
room is the following equation:
Used space x π = recommended total space
The cabin door has two lights, one pushbutton and inside the cabin the drawing
pocket for keeping electrical drawings in the cabin for later use. As for cabin
installation, the following accessories are recommended:
- Wall mounting bracket for AE, Rittal Model No. SZ 2508.100
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- Mounting bars for AE, door mounting, Rittal. Model No. varies with length,
check for suitable one.
- Outlet filter standard Rittal Model No. SK 3238.200
- Wiring plan pocket, plastic, Rittal Model No. SZ 2514.000
Rittal offers 11 sizes of compact enclosure AE cabins with the depth of 300mm as
seen in Figure 17. For aesthetic reasons enclosure that are higher than wider are
preferred.
Figure 17. Product range of Rittal compact enclosure AE-cabins. /19/
As for CJU901 and CJU541 the suitable cabin size leaving enough room for future
expansions is model AE 1180.500 with the physical size of 800 mm x 1000 mm x
300 mm as seen in Figure 18.
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Figure 18. Rittal AE 1180.500 compact enclosure. /20/
5.2 Cabin Layout
The cabin layout outside the cabin includes emergency stop reset pushbutton, two
warning lights and outlet filter for enabling air circulation for ensuring the cooling
of electrical components. The cabin outlet filter is located on the door approx.
halfway between the safety PLC and power sources for ensuring the cooling as seen
in Figure 19.
The recommended installation height of the electrical cabin from the ground to
electrical cabin bottom is 100 cm, leaving pushbuttons and two warning lights at
the height of 163 cm for ground. The height of pushbuttons and lights are on the
eye-level, making the lights easy to notice and the level of pushbutton at a practical
height.
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Figure 19. Face layout for emergency stop cabin CJU541. The electrical cabin doors
of the emergency stop system are mostly identical.
The full layout drawings of electrical cabins CJU901 and CJU541 with drill plans
are found in Appendices 1 and 3. The layout can be modified depending on the
cabin size and number of doors. The main guideline is to keep the components in
symmetrical  positions  on  the  vertical  centre  line  of  the  cabin.  The  bottom of  the
cabin has a gland plate. Cable glands are mounted on the cable gland plate for cable
entry inside the cabin. Enough cable gland places are reserved for needed cables for
the system. If the gland plate has not enough space needed for cable glands the
bottom of cabin can be used for installing more cable glands. The cable gland
drawings can be seen in Appendices 1 and 3.
5.2.1 Mounting Plate Layout
The mounting plate of Rittal AE 1180.500 cabin is slightly smaller compared to the
dimensions of the electrical cabin. The cabin dimensions are W 800 mm x H 1000
mm and the size of the mounting plate is W 739 mm x H 955 mm. 35 mm DIN rails
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are used to mount electrical components on the mounting plate and two different
sizes of cable ducts act as a cable way for internal cabling. The position of cable
ducts  and  DIN  rails  is  planned  to  leave  enough  room  for  all  the  electrical
components, making wiring easy to install and ensuring easy component change.
Short,  self-drilling  screws  are  used  to  attach  DIN  rails  and  cable  ducts  on  the
mounting plate. Components do not require special versions for DIN rails, the DIN
rail size is 35 mm x 7.5 mm. Two sizes of cable ducts used are Phoenix Contact
CD-HF 100x80 and Phoenix Contact CD-HF 60x80. Layout for DIN rails and cable
ducts can be seen in Figure 20. The detailed plan for CJU901 and CJU541 in
Appendices 2 and 4.
Figure 20. Layout of the DIN-rails and cable ducts on Rittal AE 1180.500 cabin
mounting plate.
For designing the position of the DIN rails and cable ducts the physical size of the
hardwire determines the location of cable duct for the DIN rails. For wiring
smoothness and proper fit for components, the minimum distance between the
components  and  cable  duct  is  recommended  to  be  at  least  20  mm.  Active
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components might have requirements for the minimum distance between next
components, the minimum distance requirements should always be checked from
the manual.
5.2.2 Layout of Mounting Plate Components
When attaching components on the mounting plate the location of electrical
components  have  a  huge  effect  on  the  amount  of  wiring  used  as  well  as  the
installation time of wiring. A good component layout uses the minimum amount of
wiring, has clear sections and enough space for future expansions. All the cables to
the electrical cabin connects through the terminal block. The terminal blocks should
be located near the cable entry for minimizing amount of cable running inside
electrical cabin as well leaving enough space for incoming cables. Seen an example
of CJU901 component layout in Figure 21. The detailed layout drawing for CJU901
and CJU541 can be found in Appendices 1 and 3.
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Figure 21. CJU901 layout.
This layout is on common panel CJU901. The common panel has a key operated
contact for momentary bypass for the fire alarm. The bypass is used in the monthly
functionality test of the fire alarm, allowing the test without disturbing the rest of
the facility. The layout for CJU541 is slightly different as more relays have been
used for potential free contacts. (Figure 22)
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Figure 22. CJU541 layout, slightly different compared to CJU901.
A notable difference to the common panel CJU901 is the number of relays used.
Because every machine and equipment connected to the system has a relay with a
potential free contact, the relay is used for bypassing the safety PLC extension card
voltage and current limits.
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6 PROGRAMMING WITH SAFECONF
6.1 SAFECONF Programming Tool
The SAFECONF – program is free of charge configuration program for configuring
Phoenix Contact TRISAFE and SafetyBridge products. The program has simulation
abilities for simulating and testing a safety program without hardwire or connection
for hardwire. The safety features of programming include password for hardwire,
password for program and time stamped network locking with a certificate of the
editor´s information.
The programming of safety PLC is made with SAFECONF program. The program
has a wide variety of features for documenting program revisions, hardwire,
documenting, testing of program and hardwire. These documentation abilities
increase the safety of the program as every step and modification is documented for
future use. The programming language used on SAFCONF is FBD (FBD =
Function Block Diagram) as FDB is a commonly used programming language. The
easiness of FBD comes for graphically visualised functions and connections.
Visualised functions allow the monitoring of program performance graphically.
The view of the program main window is shown in Figure 23.
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Figure 23. The  SAFECONF  –  main  window.  1.  Tool  Box,  drag  &  drop  logical
functions for toolbox. 2. Hardwire Editor, modify hardwire suitable on project and
program. Add hardware for toolbox menu with drag & drop. 3. Program Network,
add and connect logical functions, inputs and outputs for program network. 4. Menu
for properties and tools.
6.2 Connecting SAFECONF to Safety PLC
For programming the safety PLC the computer connects the TRISAFE safety PLC
with  a  USB  cable.  A  mini  USB  port  is  located  on  top  of  the  safety  PLC  for
connecting by means of programming or monitoring. The connection for the safety
PLC is opened on top menu, Safety PLC > Log On. Connecting does not have an
effect on the performance of function and connecting can be made while the system
is active and running. When logging on, the program asks for the password of the
safety PLC hardware. If the password is not entered, the connection allows only
uploading the existing program for the safety PLC to monitor online values.
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6.3 Programming
The programming of the safety PLC with the SAFECONF program is made simple
with the FBD programming. The chosen function is added on the safety network to
the tool box menu by dragging on the safety network area. The safety network area
has a grid and every function block lines with the grid. The program can consist of
multiple networks. Connecting a signal between networks is made with a connector.
The connector moves signal line between two networks. The connector can leave a
signal on multiple networks but can have only one input on one network.
Two types of functions are available, safety functions and standard functions. The
safety functions can be used to control safety inputs and the outputs and standard
functions can be used to control standard input and outputs. A safety output cannot
be controlled with standard functions but a standard output can be controlled with
safety functions.
Available functions for programming includes most commonly used Boolean logic
blocks as well common FBD – blocks seen in Figure 24.
Figure 24. Safety functions available for FBD programming of safety PLC.
The program has a variety of safe function blocks ready to use, the EmergencyStop
block is used to monitor and control emergency stop pushbuttons and emergency
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stop functions correctly. Other safe function blocks include valve monitoring, two
hand controls, external device monitoring and more. Safe function blocks have a
feature for defining start-up behaviour as the system starts. All available safety
function blocks can be seen in Figure 25.
Figure 25. Available safety function blocks for programming.
When starting a new project, a password is required to set on the project and
opening an existing project requires a password. With the password the project is
unlocked for modifications and without the password the program is only available
for viewing. Protecting the project with a password disables the possibility for
unauthorized modifications of the program and safety PLC hardwire setup,
increasing the safety of system design. Downloading the project to the safety PLC
without the project password is possible.
When a function has been added on networks, the signal connections need to be
made for forming a logic. The signal connection starts with the function connection
box,  a  small  black  square  on  the  left  and  right  side  of  the  function  block.  The
connection box on the left side of the function block is the input connection, the
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connection boxes on the right side are function output. For basic functions the
numbers of inputs can be increased or decreased depending on the need. The
connection example is shown in Figure 26 and Figure 27.
Figure 26 (left). If connection is allowed the straight line apperas in green colour.
If connection is not allowed line is red and connection is not made. Figure 27 (right).
Succsesfull connection.
Downloading the program to the safety PLC stops all functions of the safety PLC,
changing all outputs to zero. When the program is loaded onto the safety PLC, it
has to be confirmed with the CONFIRM button located on top of the master module.
(Figure 28.)
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Figure 28. CONFIRM – button is located in a hole right above Mini USB port. The
button can be used with a pen or a match. A small click is enough for confirming
the new program downloaded on the safety PLC.
After confirming the downloaded project, the safety PLC performs a restart in order
to take the downloaded program in use. Downloading a new program is only the
interruption in the emergency stop system as the new program is taken in use.
6.4 CJU901 and CJU541 Program
Programs for two systems, common panel CJU901 and test rig area CJU541 are
nearly identical. The main feature of the program are emergency stop function,
indications and extension possibilities for programming. The emergency stop
function block is used for emergency stop control.
The program of CJU901 consists of the main safety network and ten extension card
networks. The main network consists of the emergency stop program with reset
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abilities. All the logical functions are built in the main network. The main network
can be seen in Figure 29.
Figure 29. Main network on Common panel CJU901 program. The main network
has all properties on build.
The main network has all common panel alarms in one single place. The emergency
stop function block is used to control all the alarms. Fire alarm bypassing de-
activates the fire alarm input effect. All the alarm input reserved for common panel
alarms are pre-programmed in the main network, small modifications might be
needed when connecting more alarms to the system. Reset has a half second turn
on delay, limiting the possibility of unintended reset, as the reset button has to be
pressed more than half a second.
Non-safety outputs are used in indication lamps, seen as grey outputs. Transferring
the emergency stop signal to the extension card is made with connectors, seen in
Figure 30 on the right side. Connectors can have a single input but can be placed as
output signal in many networks.
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The extension card safety network is simply just reserving space for future
programming expansions. If an individual logic for single contacts is needed, the
extension card network has reserved space for extensions. Safety functions can be
added by simply replacing TRUE block for extension card network. Extension
networks are identical for all cards. See Figure 30.
Figure 30. Common panel CJU901 extension card program, each extension card
program has its own program network.
Keeping an extension card program on its own, an individual network facilitates the
main network programming and leaving more space for future program expansions,
as part of the programming can be made on extension card network.
The emergency stop CJU541 program has a lot of similarities with CJU901
program, as two cabins have the similar hardware. Differences between
programming are see in Figure 31.
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Figure 31. CJU541 area main network. Similarities between common panel and test
rig area emergency stop is notable.
CJU541 programming has the same basic principle, the emergency stop function
block controls the alarms. The fire alarm is seen as its own input on the same level
as a regular emergency stop. Each individual emergency stop available is pre-
programmed in the program as the short-circuited terminal block simulates the
emergency stop pushbutton in the program. This allows the installation of
emergency stop pushbutton without modifications in the program, as installation
can be made and taken into use by removing the short circuiting for the terminal
block. Resetting has the same half second delay.
The emergency stop cabin CJU541 program has individual networks for extension
cards, as does the common panel program. An example of extension card program
can be seen in Figure 32.
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Figure 32. CJU541 extension card program. Every extension card has own network
giving more space for future program modifications.
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7 CONCLUSIONS
In  this  thesis  the  main  goal  was  to  create  a  standard  solution  for  the  engine
laboratory for future use and understanding the old complex system with it
disadvantages and advantages. The old system had been expanded to many
directions, connected to new areas creating a complicated mess. Understanding the
old system took quite a while, as documentation was imperfect. Drawing the new
electrical pictures based on the old modified pictures did help quite a lot. Still lot of
research was made to find all connections around the building.
As for planning the new system, recommendation to use the safety PLC solution
gave a direction to go with the designing. The simplicity of system keeps everything
under control as complicated sections can easily confuse and cause unnoticed
mistakes, creating potentially a danger. The safety PLC solution is a good choice
for the future, it can be used in a much complicated way and leaving a lot of extra
space for cabin helps a lot for a future modifications.
A lot of thinking has been done to ponder what can and cannot be done with the
system up and running, as one requirement was to keep everything independent and
not affecting each other. This also added simplicity, usually complicated systems
will have a huge effect on the entire system if one part is down for maintenance or
broken.
As for timing, it followed quite well the ideal timing. Now at end of the project the
installation and cabin assembly is made a couple of weeks later than though. A lot
of  time  was  given  to  do  the  work  and  the  work  place  is  real  professional.  A
complicated building creates complicated problems, still time to time it can be
solved with a simple solutions.
The design is making its way in use, the first panels, the common panel CJU901
and the emergency stop cabin CJU541 are begin built and will be taken in use at
incoming weeks.
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